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Facts
In the early nineties, Christopher Edwards, the applicants’ son, showed signs of developing a
serious mental illness. In 1994 he moved out of his parents’ home and stopped taking his
medication. On 27 November 1994 he was arrested by police in Colchester for approaching young
women in the street and making inappropriate suggestions. Police officers detained him overnight
in the police station, suspecting that he might be mentally ill, but that he did not need urgent
medical attention. The next day he was brought to the Magistrates’ Court where he confronted a
female prison officer and shouted obscene suggestions about women. The magistrates considered
remanding him to a psychiatric hospital for assessment, but concluded there was no power to do
so under section 30 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. No consideration was given to civil
detention under sections 2, 3 or 4 of the Mental Health Act 1983 or section 35 which allows for a
remand to hospital for assessment. Magistrates remanded him into custody for three days and he
was taken to Chelmsford Prison that afternoon.
In the meantime Christopher Edwards’s father contacted the probation service at the prison, and
informed them that his son had a mental illness and had been prescribed stelazine, though he had
been refusing to take it or accept that he was mentally ill. The probation officer visited the prison’s
health care centre and spoke to the senior medical officer (though there was a later dispute about
the detail of what was passed on).
The reception staff at Chelmsford Prison noted that Christopher Edwards’s behaviour was
“strange” and “odd” and when being placed in the holding cell he was aggressive and tried to punch
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a prison officer. After two hours, he was screened by a non-physician member of the prison health
care staff who saw no reason to admit him to the Health Care Centre. This person knew nothing
about previous discussions in the court or the concerns passed onto the prison probation officer
(and then onto the centre’s own senior medical officer) about Christopher Edwards’s mental health.
There was no evidence of active mental disturbance or bizarre behaviour during the short health
care interview. By this time there was no doctor on duty at the centre, nor indeed present in the
prison. Christopher Edwards was admitted to the main prison and placed in cell D1–6 on his own.
Meanwhile, Richard Linford was arrested on 26 November 1994 for assault. At Maldon police
station, a police surgeon certified that Richard Linford was not fit to be detained, but a psychiatric
registrar decided that he did not need to be admitted to hospital and was fit to be detained. He was
transferred to Chelmsford police station, where the police surgeon also found him fit to be
detained. The registrar, who had previously treated Richard Linford, knew that he had been
diagnosed at various times as suffering from schizophrenia or as having a personality disorder, but
also knew him as someone who became ill when abusing alcohol and drugs. On 28 November 1994,
Richard Linford was remanded in custody by Chelmsford Magistrates’ Court and arrived at
Chelmsford Prison shortly after Christopher Edwards, where he was screened by the same member
of the prison health care service who had screened Christopher Edwards. Richard Linford was
placed in a cell on his own, but later moved into cell D1–6 with Christopher Edwards. This was
due to shortage of space, as all the other cells on the landing were doubly occupied.
Each cell had a green emergency light situated on the wall outside the cell next to the door which
illuminated when the call button was depressed inside the cell. When the button was pressed, a
buzzer sounded on the landing and a red light illuminated on a control panel in the office on the
landing. At 9 p.m., either Christopher Edwards or Richard Linford pressed the call button. 
A prison officer saw the green light outside the cell and was told that they wished one of the cell
lights, operated from the exterior, to be switched off, which he did. The two men were reported to
be “getting on all right”. He noticed that while the green light had gone on the buzzer which should
have been sounding continuously had not done so, but did not report the defect. 
Shortly before 1 a.m. on 29 November 1994, a prison officer heard a buzzer sound, but saw no red
light on the D–landing control panel. Some time later, he heard continuous banging on a cell door
on his landing. On going to investigate he saw the green light on outside cell D1–6. Looking
through the spy hole, he saw Richard Linford holding a bloodstained plastic fork and blood on the
floor and on Linford’s feet. There was a delay of five minutes while officers put on protective
clothing. They entered the cell to find that Christopher Edwards had been stamped and kicked to
death. Richard Linford was making continual reference to being possessed by evil spirits and
devils. D–landing had previously been patrolled at 12.43 a.m., which indicated that up to seventeen
minutes could have elapsed from the pressing of the cell call button. 
On 21 April 1995, Richard Linford pleaded guilty at Chelmsford Crown Court to the
manslaughter of Christopher Edwards by reason of diminished responsibility. The judge imposed
a hospital order under section 37 Mental Health Act 1983, coupled with a restriction order under
section 41. 
A Coroner’s Inquest had been opened but adjourned pending the criminal proceedings against
Richard Linford. After his conviction, the Coroner closed the Inquest, as there was no obligation
to continue in those circumstances.
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In July 1995, a private, non-statutory “inquiry after homicide” was commissioned by three agencies
with statutory responsibilities towards Christopher Edwards – the Prison Service, Essex County
Council and North Essex Health Authority. Its terms of reference included to investigate the extent
to which the various authorities corresponded to statutory obligations, to examine the
communication between the agencies involved in providing services to both men, and to examine
the adequacy of the treatment and care as well as the arrest, detention and custody of them both. 
On 16 October 1995, the applicants (Christopher Edwards’s parents) were advised by the Assistant
Chief Constable that there was insufficient evidence to establish the offence of manslaughter by
gross negligence on the part of anyone involved in the case.
In February 1996, the applicants were advised by their solicitors that they had a claim for funeral
costs and a potential claim for compensation and any pain and suffering between Christopher
Edwards’ injury and death. However, the high legal costs made it economically disadvantageous to
bring such a claim. In April 1996, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarded the
applicants £4,550 for funeral expenses but decided that there should be no dependency or
bereavement award. 
The Inquiry opened in May 1996. The panel was chaired by Kieran Coonan QC with prominent
psychiatric, social services, prison and police experts as members. They were assisted by a firm of
solicitors. The Inquiry received evidence on 56 days over a period of 10 months. The Inquiry Panel
conducted visits to the police stations, magistrates’ court and prison concerned. About 150
witnesses attended the Inquiry to give evidence while a considerable number of others submitted
written evidence. It sat in private and – as a non-statutory inquiry – had no powers of compulsion
of witnesses or production of documents. 
Two prison officers refused to give evidence. The Inquiry Report later noted that one of these had
potentially significant evidence and his refusal was said to be “all the more regrettable since he had
passed by Christopher Edwards’s cell shortly before he met his death”. 
The Inquiry Report was published on 15 June 1998.1 It ran to 388 pages and reached numerous
findings of defects and made recommendations for future practice. It concluded that ideally
Christopher Edwards and Richard Linford should not have been in prison and in practice they
should not have been sharing the cell. It found “a systemic collapse of the protective mechanisms
that ought to have operated to protect this vulnerable prisoner”. It identified a series of
shortcomings, including poor record-keeping, inadequate communication and limited inter-agency
co-operation, and a number of missed opportunities to prevent the death of Christopher Edwards.
Following the publication of the report, the applicants sought advice as to whether there were any
civil remedies available to them in the light of the findings of the Inquiry, but were advised by
counsel that there were none. 
By letter of 25 November 1998, the Crown Prosecution Service maintained their previous decision
that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal charges, an opinion supported by
counsel for the applicants. Further, it is not possible under the common law to recover damages in
tort for the death of another.
1 ‘Report of the Inquiry into the Care and Treatment of Christopher Edwards and Richard Linford: A Report commissioned
by North Essex Health Authority, Essex County Council and HM Prison Service in association with Essex Police 2001’
(available from the Health Authority). 
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By letter dated 15 December 2000, the Police Complaints Authority provided the applicants with
a report into their complaints about police conduct in dealing with Christopher Edwards and in
the subsequent investigation into the death. The report upheld fifteen of the complaints and made
a number of recommendations to Essex Police in relation to practice and procedure. 
Judgment
(a) Right to life – substantive aspects
The applicants complained to the European Court of Human Rights that the authorities failed to
protect the life of their son and were responsible for his death. They also complained that the
investigation into their son’s death was not adequate or effective as required by the procedural
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention, which provides in its first sentence:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. ...”
The Court reiterated that the first sentence of Article 2(1) obliges States not only to refrain from the
intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of
those within its jurisdiction, primarily by putting in place effective criminal law provisions backed up
by law enforcement machinery. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation
on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk
from the criminal acts of another individual. The Court said that the scope of the positive obligation
must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on
the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life therefore can entail for the authorities a Convention
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive
obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the
time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers
which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.
The Court stressed that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are
under a duty to protect them, a duty recognized in English and Welsh law where inquests are
automatically held concerning the deaths of persons in prison and where the courts have imposed
a duty of care on prison authorities in respect of those detained in their custody.
The Inquiry panel had concluded that any prisoner sharing a cell with Richard Linford that night
would have been at risk to his life. For the Court, the essential question therefore was whether the
prison authorities knew or ought to have known of his extreme dangerousness at the time the
decision was taken to place him in the same cell as Christopher Edwards. The Court was satisfied
that the answer to this question was yes.
Notwithstanding the defective buzzer system, the Court concluded that on the information
available to the authorities Christopher Edwards’s life was placed at risk by placing a dangerously
unstable prisoner into his cell. The failure of the agencies involved to pass on information about
Richard Linford to the prison authorities and the inadequate nature of the screening process on
Richard Linford’s arrival in prison disclosed a breach of the UK’s obligation to protect the life of
Christopher Edwards, in violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
Right to life – European Convention on Human Rights
81
(b) Right to life – procedural aspects
The obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction
with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its]
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, also requires by implication that
there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as
a result of the use of force (see, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom).2 Such investigations
must seek to secure the effective implementation of laws which protect the right to life and, in
those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring
under their responsibility. What form of investigation will achieve those purposes may vary in
different circumstances, but whichever form is employed, the authorities must act of their own
motion, once the matter has come to their attention. It is not the duty of the next of kin either to
lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures. 
The Court reiterated that for an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be
effective the following points must be observed:
The persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation must be institutionally and
practically independent from those implicated in the events.
The investigation must also be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those
responsible, and to a determination of whether any force used was or was not justified in the
circumstances. The authorities must take reasonable steps to secure evidence, including eye witness
testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and
accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of
death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of
death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling short of this standard.
Inquiries must be prompt, to maintain public confidence in the adherence to the rule of law and
in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons,
there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure
accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary
from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim’s next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure
to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.
In this case, the Court found that because Christopher Edwards was a prisoner under the care and
responsibility of the State when he died from acts of violence of another prisoner, a procedural
obligation arose to investigate the circumstances of his death. It was irrelevant whether State agents
were involved by acts or omissions in the events leading to his death. Even if civil proceedings were
available, such actions initiated by the applicants would not satisfy the State’s obligation to hold an
investigation of its own motion.
As no inquest was held in this case and criminal proceedings where Richard Linford was convicted
did not involve a trial at which witnesses were examined, the investigation at the heart of the
Court’s examination was whether the Inquiry provided an effective investigative procedure,
fulfilling the requirements already identified. 
The Court noted that this Inquiry heard a large number of witnesses and reviewed in detail the
2 Judgment of 22 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 49, § 161
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way in which the two men were treated by the various medical, police, judicial and prison
authorities. The Report of the Inquiry was a meticulous document, Nonetheless, the applicants
complained that the Inquiry proceedings failed to reach the required standards under Article 2 on
a number of grounds:
(i) Alleged shortcomings in the investigation
The applicants complained that the police omitted certain significant steps in their investigation, a
claim which the government denied. The Court found that this did not prevent the Inquiry from
establishing the principal facts of the case.
(ii) Lack of power to compel witnesses
As a non-statutory inquiry, the Inquiry had no power to compel witnesses and as a result two
prison officers declined to attend. One of the prison officers had walked past the cell shortly
before the death was discovered and the Inquiry considered that his evidence would have had
potential significance. The Government asserted that this witness had submitted two statements
and that there is no indication that he had anything different or additional to add. 
The Court noted that he was not available for questions to be put to him which might have
required further detail or clarification or for any inconsistency or omissions in that account to be
tested. The lack of compulsion of witnesses who are either eye-witnesses or have material evidence
related to the circumstances of a death must be regarded as diminishing the effectiveness of the
Inquiry as an investigative mechanism. In this case it detracted from its capacity to establish the
facts relevant to the death, and thereby to achieve one of the purposes required by Article 2 of the
Convention.
(iii) Alleged lack of independence
The applicants alleged that the Inquiry lacked independence as it was set up by the agencies with
statutory responsibilities towards both Christopher Edwards and Richard Linford. The Court
noted that the chairman was a senior member of the bar with judicial experience, while the other
members were eminent or experienced in their fields. None had any hierarchical link to the
agencies in question. It is not asserted that they failed to act with independence or that they were
constrained in any way. They acted in an independent capacity, therefore the Court found no lack
of independence in the Inquiry.
(iv) Alleged lack of public scrutiny
Notwithstanding the public nature of the Inquiry’s report, the Inquiry sat in private during its
hearing of evidence and witnesses. The applicants, parents of the deceased, were only able to
attend three days of the Inquiry when they themselves were giving evidence. They were not
represented and were unable to put any questions to witnesses, whether through their own counsel
or otherwise. They had to wait until the publication of the final version of the Inquiry Report to
discover the substance of the evidence about what had happened to their son. The applicants
argued that this did not meet the standards of public scrutiny required by Article 2. The
Government argued that the publication of the report secured the requisite degree of public
scrutiny, but gave no reason for holding the inquiry in private.
The Court stated that where the deceased was a vulnerable individual who lost his life in a
horrendous manner due to a series of failures by public bodies and servants who bore a
responsibility to safeguard his welfare, the public interest attaching to the issues thrown up by the
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case was such as to call for the widest exposure possible. Given their close and personal concern
with the subject-matter of the Inquiry, the Court found that the parents cannot be regarded as
having been involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their interests, in
violation of the procedural requirements of Article 2.
(v) Alleged lack of promptness and reasonable expedition
The applicants alleged that the Inquiry lacked sufficient promptness. Christopher Edwards died on
29 November 1994. The decision to hold an inquiry was taken in July 1995 and the proceedings
opened in May 1996, with witnesses heard over the following ten-month period. The report was
issued on 15 June 1998, some two years after the Inquiry opened and three and a half years after
the death. 
The Court noted the considerable amount of preparation required for an inquiry of this
complexity, the number of witnesses involved in the proceedings (about 150 people gave oral
evidence) and the wide scope of the investigation which covered the involvement of numerous
public services. It held that authorities acted with sufficient promptness and proceeded with
reasonable expedition.
(c) Article 13
Article 13 of the Convention provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have
an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the
Convention rights. Article 13 thus requires the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the
substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. 
The remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law. There must be
a mechanism for a victim or family to establish any liability of State officials or bodies for acts or
omissions involving the breach of their rights under the Convention. The Court added that in the
case of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment) of the Convention, compensation for the non-pecuniary damage flowing
from the breach should in principle be available as part of the range of redress.
On the basis of the evidence adduced in the present case, the Court found that the Government was
responsible under Article 2 for failing adequately to protect the life of Christopher Edwards while
he was in the care of the prison authorities. The Court recalled that in general actions in the
domestic courts for damages may provide an effective remedy in cases of alleged unlawfulness or
negligence by public authorities. However the Court did not find that civil action in negligence or
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 was in the circumstances of the case of practical use. Nor would
a case which could be brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, as it would relate only to any
continuing breach of the Convention after the entry into force of the Act (2 October 2000) and
would not provide damages related to the death of Christopher Edwards which preceded that date. 
No other procedure whereby the liability of the authorities can be established in an independent,
public and effective manner was referred to. The Court therefore found the applicants did not have
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available to them an appropriate means of obtaining a determination of their allegations that the
authorities failed to protect their son’s right to life and the possibility of obtaining an enforceable
award of compensation for damages. For a bereaved parent this was an essential element of a
remedy under Article 13, which in this case had been violated.3
Costs
Under Article 44 of the Convention, the Court ordered the government to pay the applicants
£20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and £20,000 in respect of costs and expenses plus
taxes.
Commentary
The tragic death of Christopher Edwards and the determination of his parents to seek justice4
demonstrates the way that a system may fail adequately to protect the life of an individual and then
fail to allow that person’s grieving family to have a full investigation into the death. Although it
was not the purpose of the Inquiry to offer comfort to the family of Christopher Edwards,
Inquiries must have in mind not just the feelings of secondary victims of homicides, but also their
human rights. 
Perhaps the more interesting aspect of this case from a legal perspective is how the procedural
aspects of Article 2 – not set out in the Convention itself – have evolved since the mid 1990s in a
series of cases brought to the Strasbourg court against primarily the UK and Turkey. It is now clear
that where a death occurs – whether or not at the hands of state agents,5 and whether or not
violence was used6 – there must be an investigation which is independent, public, prompt,
thorough, effective, capable of imputing responsibility for the death, and enables effective
involvement of the next of kin. This obligation now extends to cases of possible medical
negligence in respect of an individual under the care and responsibility of health professionals,7
and to situations where victims have been paid compensation but there has been no (or an
inadequate) investigation.8
The death of Christopher Edwards was the central issue of at least six different domestic
investigations: First, the criminal trial of Richard Linford at which he pleaded guilty to the
manslaughter of Christopher Edwards by reason of diminished responsibility. Second, the Crown
Prosecution Service which decided there was insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal
charges. Third, the Coroner’s Inquest which had closed without hearing evidence after the
conviction of Richard Linford. Fourth, the Police Complaints Authority reported on police
conduct in dealing with Christopher Edwards and in the subsequent investigation into the death,
3 See also Keenan v. the United Kingdom, (2001) 33
E.H.R.R. 38, paragraph 132
4 See Edwards, A, “No Truth, No Justice: A David and
Goliath Story of a Mother’s Struggle Against Public
Authorities to Secure Justice for Her Son, Murdered
While in Their Care” Waterside Press, 2002
5 See Yasa v. Turkey (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 408; Kaya v.
Turkey (1998) 28 E.H.R.R. 1; Cakici v. Turkey,
Judgment 8 July 1999 (paragraph 87)
6 See McShane v. the United Kingdom (2002) 34
E.H.R.R. 23
7 See Erikson v. Italy, Application no. 37900/97,
judgment 26 October 1999, Siemiska v. Poland,
Application no. 37602/97, judgment 29 March 2001
and Powell v. the United Kingdom, Application no.
45305/99; admissibility decision 4 May 2000.
8 See Jordan v. the United Kingdom , (2001) 11
B.H.R.C. 1 
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upholding fifteen of the applicants’ complaints and making a number of recommendations to
Essex Police in relation to practice and procedure. Fifth, the Health and Safety Executive carried
out an investigation focusing on the management of the two people in prison. Sixth, the private,
non-statutory Inquiry chaired by Kieran Coonan QC which was the subject of the case at
Strasbourg.
Notwithstanding the elaborate (not to mention expensive) system of investigating deaths in
England and Wales, the Court found that the UK had failed in its obligation under the procedural
aspects of the right to life. Principally there were two aspects of the Inquiry which were found to
violate Article 2: 
First, that the Inquiry sat in private. Thus Christopher Edwards’s parents were not allowed to be
present or take part in the proceedings. They had to wait two years after the Inquiry opened and
three and a half years after the death to find out the circumstances surrounding their son’s death.
Had there been a full coroner’s inquest, the family would have been entitled to be present and be
represented (albeit without public funding) by counsel. 
In order not to fall foul of ECHR standards in future Inquiries, the Inquiry Chairperson could
meet the family of the deceased to enquire into whether they would like to be present during the
hearing, and if so, whether they would like to be legally represented. Such representation would
have to be funded by the commissioning health or social services authority. In Edwards the UK
government provided no reasons for the Inquiry being held in private. The Court stated that it
“considers that the public interest attaching to the issues thrown up by the case was such as to call
for the widest exposure possible”.9 How one would challenge an Inquiry which (with the next-of-
kin’s consent) sits in private is a matter for speculation. It would be difficult if not impossible for
a non next-of-kin to challenge this given the current rules of victim status in Article 34 of the
Convention and jurisprudence under that Article.10
Second, the Court found that the Inquiry’s inability in law to compel witnesses to attend to give
live evidence diminished the effectiveness of the Inquiry as an investigative mechanism and
detracted from its capacity to establish the facts relevant to the death.11 Although it has been said
that witnesses who do not attend voluntarily are “usually unwilling and unforthcoming witnesses,
if not actually unreliable”,12 this was an exceptional case where there were witnesses who could
usefully have been cross-examined about information not contained in their written statements. 
The UK government has issued no guidance following the Edwards case. Given that there are
numerous Inquiries taking place across the country, Inquiry panels may find themselves – as many
have done in the past – in a position where they want to compel a witness to attend but lack the
legal basis on which to do so. In such circumstances (and if the specific statutory criteria are met)
the panel or the appointing authority could ask the Secretary of State to establish a statutory
inquiry either under section 125 Mental Health Act 1983 or under section 84 National Health
Service Act 1977. If this is refused, the Inquiry or appointing authority might contemplate issuing
proceedings in the Administrative Court to challenge the Secretary of State’s refusal to comply
9 Paragraph 83 of the judgment. 
10 Article 34 ECHR states that the Court may receive an
application from any individual or group “claiming to
be the victim of a violation” of the Convention.
11 The Inquiry lacked the power to compel witnesses as it
was non-statutory and thus fell outside the scope of the
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. 
12 Clothier, C., “Ruminations on Inquiries”, in Peay, J.
(ed), Inquiries After Homicide, 1996
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with Convention requirements. 
A final point of interest is that of victim status. The Strasbourg Court has said that, “[t]he mere
knowledge of the killing on the part of the authorities gives rise ipso facto to an obligation under
Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the death.”13 Relatives do not need to instigate such investigations, but the
Convention allows relatives of those who have died to be regarded as “victims”.14 What happens
in cases where there are no family members? There are alarming cases of grossly elevated mortality
rates within some State-run mental health institutions within the Strasbourg Court’s jurisdiction.15
When residents die (for example of malnutrition or hypothermia) there are no investigations of
any sort. For thousands of vulnerable people facing early and un-investigated death there is often
no-one – like Paul and Audrey Edwards – to bring such gross failures to the Court’s attention. 
The Council of Europe should re-visit the Convention’s rule on victim status and allow 
non-governmental organizations to lodge Article 2 complaints in which they are not the primary
victim. This may save the lives of numerous people for whom the right to life protection under the
European Convention of Human Rights is currently meaningless.
13 Ergi v. Turkey, Judgment 28 July 1998. R.J.D. 1998–IV
1778 (paragraph 82)
14 See Article 34 of the Convention and Yasa v Turkey
(1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 408 (nephew of deceased as
victim); H v. the United Kingdom, Application no.
9833/82; 42 D.R. 53 (mother of murdered person as
victim); Wolfgram v. Germany, Application no.
11257/84; 49 D.R. 213 (parents of deceased as
victims).
15 See for example, Amnesty International, “Bulgaria:
Where are the men of Dragash Voyvoda?”, AI Index:
EUR 15/005/2003, which states that, “[t]he most
telling indicator of the gross neglect that men of
Dragash Voyvoda had been subjected to was the
unacceptably high mortality rate in the institution.
During 2001, approximately every fifth man in this
social care home, which held around 140 men, died
apparently as a result of inadequate medical treatment
and care.”
